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The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court's finding of liability under 
both the disparate impact and disparate 
treatment theories. The court stated that 
Washington's decision to base compensa-
tion on the competitive market, rather 
than on a theory of comparable worth, was 
not a clearly delineated practice applied at 
a single point in the job selection process. 
The court noted that the decision to base 
compensation on the competitive market 
involves the assessment offactors too com-
plex and multifaceted for disparate impact 
analysis. Some of those factors included: 
surveys, hearings, administrative recom-
mendations, budget proposals, executive 
actions and legislative enactments. As a re-
sult there was no disparate impact found. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals overturned 
the district court's determination of dis-
parate treatment because it found that dis-
criminatory intent had not been proven. 
Although in appropriate cases discrimina-
tory intent may be inferred from circum-
stantial or direct evidence, the court held 
that the findings of "The Willis Study" 
alone, (that the state sets compensation at 
the market rate), would not establish the 
requisite intent without corroborating evi-
dence. The court stated that although the 
state participates in the market system, it 
did not create the market disparity and 
that setting pay rates according to the pre-
vailing market rate does not support the 
inference of intent to discriminate. The 
court noted that in some cases an inference 
of intent may be drawn from statistical evi-
dence, but the weight given to statistical 
evidence is determined by the existence of 
independent corroborative evidence of dis-
crimination such as testimony of specific 
incidents of discrimination. 
The court also rejected AFSCME's con-
tention that because the state commis-
sioned "The Willis Study", it was com-
mitted to implementing a new system of 
compensation based on comparable worth 
as defined in the study. The court was hes-
itant to adopt a rule that had the effect of 
penalizing rather than commending em-
ployers for their innovation in undertaking 
such a study. The court was also reluctant 
to bind the state to base its decision on 
the results of one study because different 
studies produce different results which the 
employer should be permitted to take into 
account when determining rate of pay. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals found neither dis-
parate impact nor disparate treatment. 
They held, therefore, that no Title VII 
violation had occurred. 
(AFSCME is currently petitioning the 
United States Supreme Court to hear this 
case.) 
-Audrey A. Creighton 
Hamilton v. State: JUDICIAL 
APPROVAL OF "JAIL HOUSE 
PLANTS" 
In Hamilton v. State, 62 Md. App. 603, 
490 A.2d 763 (1985), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that a defen-
dant's statements to an acquaintance while 
both were incarcerated, did not amount to 
custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 
warnings even though the acquaintance 
carried on the conversation at the direction 
of the police. 
In the course of a murder investigation, 
the Maryland State Police became sus-
picious of the defendant, Raymond Ham-
ilton, who was incarcerated in the Mary-
land House of Correction in connection 
with an unrelated matter. At the behest of 
the State Police, an acquaintance of Ham-
ilton's, named Fowler, agreed to tape his 
conversation with the defendant in ex-
change for the authorities' consideration 
on pending charges. On two occasions, the 
acquaintance visited Hamilton and elicited 
from him incriminating statements regard-
ing the murder. These statements were 
made without the benefit of Miranda warn-
ings. The trial court denied the defendant's 
motion to suppress his statements, and as a 
result he was subsequently convicted of 
murder and various related offenses. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that 
the admission of the statements made to 
the acquaintance were in violation of his 
fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The court noted, as a pre-
liminary matter, that the admission of the 
taped conversations violated neither the 
Maryland nor federal wiretap statute. MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROe. CODE ANN. § 
1O-402(c)(2)(1984); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)(c) 
(1982). Additionally, the court held that 
the admission of the tapes did not violate 
Hamilton's fourth amendment protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
because "[t]he law gives no protection to 
the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice 
is or becomes a police agent .... " Hamil-
ton, 62 Md. App. at 608, 590 A.2d at 766 
(quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745,752 (1971». 
Turning to the defendant's fifth amend-
ment claim, Judge Alpert, writing for a 
unanimous court, stated that "Miranda 
warnings must be given when 'an individ-
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defect in the handgun itself, such as hav-
ing a safety mechanism that fails under cer-
tain circumstances, or having a tendency 
to misfire, or having a trigger structure 
that easily catches on foreign objects and 
thereby causes an accidental discharge. It 
simply quarrels with the judicial policy-
making that will hold it responsible for a 
third party's deliberate misuse of its prod-
uct. As an aside, statistics of the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms seem to 
suggest that criminals prefer to use high 
quality .38 and .357 caliber revolvers (the 
same type of handgun as used by police 
organizations) over the so-called Saturday 
Night Special in any event. To add an-
other dimension, the underpinning ra-
tionale for the Kelley decision suggests 
that there may be room in the cause of ac-
tion for other types of analogous instru-
mentalities-e.g., a sawed-ofT shotgun or 
the switchblade knife. Only time will tell, 
however! 
EdwardS. Digges,Jr., isa1968grad-
uate of Princeton University and a 1971 
graduate of the University of Maryland 
School of Law. Mr. Digges is a triallaw-
yer, appellate advocate, instructor, au-
thor, and member of the American Law 
Institute. His contributions to the legal 
community are too numerous to begin to 
list. In the Kelley case he was counselfor 
Colt Industries, Smith & Wesson, and 
Sturm, Ruger & Co., and wrote their 
amicus curiae brief to the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. 
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ual is taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to 
questioning.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 
609,490 A.2d at 766 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436,478 (1966)). Thus, the court reasoned 
that in order to find a violation of Miranda, 
it must be found "(a) that appellant was in-
terrogated; (b) that the interrogation oc-
curred while he was in custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom; and (c) that 
appellant was not properly advised of his 
Miranda rights." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. 
at 609, 490 A.2d at 766. 
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The court quickly found that the ac-
quaintance's conversations with the de-
fendant amounted to an interrogation be-
cause he was an agent of the state sent 
expressly to question the defendant about 
the murder. Additionally, it is clear that 
the defendant was not properly advised of 
his Miranda rights. However, the second 
element, that of custody, was missing. 
"Only if the accused is in a situation 
where there are inherently compelling 
pressures to respond to interrogation are 
Miranda warnings required." Hamilton, 
62 Md. App. at 611, 490 A.2d at 767. The 
court discussed the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293 (1966) in reaching its decision. In that 
case the Court held that the use of testi-
mony of a government informer concern-
ing conversations between the informer 
and the defendant did not violate the de-
fendant's fifth amendment rights. "[S]ince 
at least as long as 1807, when ChiefJustice 
Marshall first gave attention to the matter 
in the trial of Aaron Burr, all have agreed 
that a necessary element of compulsory 
self-incrimination is some kind of compul-
sion .... " /d. at 304 (footnote omitted), 
quoted in Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 612, 
490 A.2d at 767. The conversations in 
Hoffa, however, took place in the defen-
dant's hotel suite and not in a jail cell. 
Judge Alpert then turned to the Court's 
decision in United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980). 
[T]he Supreme Court, while holding 
that statements made to a police in-
formant after indictment of the ac-
cused and while the accused was incar-
cerated were inadmissible on Sixth 
Amendment grounds, addressed Fifth 
Amendment concerns in dicta. Citing 
Hoffa for authority, the Court noted 
that "the Fifth Amendment has not 
been held to be implicated by the use 
of undercover Government agents be-
fore charges are filed because of the ab-
sence of the potential of compulsion." 
Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 613, 490 A.2d 
at 768 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 272). 
Although the environment involved in 
Hamilton, namely the confines of a prison 
cell, leads to thoughts of custody, the court 
concluded that there was nothing coercive 
in the casual questioning of Hamilton by 
Fowler. The court noted that Hamilton 
"spoke with Fowler of his own volition, 
was not required to stay and continue the 
conversation and could have left Fowler at 
any time." Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 615, 
490 A.2d at 769. The court cautioned that 
"[w]e must not forget that 'Miranda . .. 
was aimed not at self-crimination generally 
. . . but at compelled self-incrimination-
the inherent coercion of the custodial, in-
communicado, third-degree questioning 
process.'" Hamilton, 62 Md. App. at 616, 
490 A.2d at 769 (quoting Cummings v. 
State, 27 Md. App. 361, 364, 341 A.2d 
294,297, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740 (1975)). 
Thus, the court concluded "that despite 
appellant's incarceration the interrogation 
was not custodial." Hamilton, at 615, 490 
A.2d at 769. 
Before Hamilton, the "jail plant" situa-
tion arose in Leuschner v. State, 41 Md. 
App. 423, 397 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 285 
Md. 731, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933 (1979). 
In that case, an undercover State Police of-
ficer had been placed in the defendant's 
jail cell under false pretenses. Statements 
made by the accused were held admissible 
because they were not made in response to 
interrogation. The Hamilton court distin-
guished its situation from that in Leuschner. 
The court's decision in Hamilton is sure 
to delight law enforcement personnel. The 
use of "jail plants," which has long been a 
favored investigatory tactic, now has the 
court's official stamp of approval. This 
tactic, though, is not without its share of 
criticism. One court has stated that "[t]he 
frustration of the prosecuting authorities 
is understandable. There is, however, no 
excuse for this questionable conduct, which 
might result in reversal in a closer case." 
Flittie v. Solem, 751 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 
1985). But see Kamisar, Brewer v. Wil-
liams, Messiah, and Miranda; What Is ''In-
terrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67 
Geo. L. J. 1, 69 (1978). 
- Edward B. Lattner 
Bailey v. State: PRE-TRIAL 
DISCLOSURE EXTENDED TO 
NON-MARYLAND POLICE 
OFFICER 
In Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 
A.2d 665 (1985) the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that oral statements which 
the state intended to use at trial and which 
had been made by the defendant to out-of-
state police were statements made by the 
defendant to a state agent within the mean-
ing of Md. Rule 4-263(b)(2) (formerly 
Rule 741(b)(2». 
The appellant, Bailey, was charged with 
having committed a robbery with a deadly 
weapon on September 29, 1983. Along 
with other property alleged to have been 
taken from the victim was a 1967 Ford 
Mustang. Bailey and a companion were ar-
rested later that day in possession of the 
Mustang on the New Jersey Turnpike by 
Officer Jenkins, of the New Jersey State 
Police. 
On February 16, 1984, the state said 
that Bailey had made no oral or written 
statements known to them at that time. 
The defendant then formally requested, 
pursuant to Md. Rule 4-263(b), that the 
state submit a copy of the substance of 
each statement made by the defendant to a 
"state agent" that the state intended to use 
at trial. The state did not respond, leaving 
intact its position that no statement had 
been made. The state did, however, list 
Officer Jenkins as a witness it intended to 
call. 
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At trial, during the opening statement, 
the prosecution. made reference to and de-
scribed the prearrest statement made by 
the defendant to Officer Jenkins. The de-
fense objected based on the state's failure 
to disclose this statement prior to trial. 
The trial court ruled there was no discov-
ery violation because Officer Jenkins was 
not a "state agent" within the meaning of 
that phrase as used in Maryland Rule 
4-263. 
The court of appeals granted certiorari 
to decide whether the statements made by 
the defendant to non-Maryland police of-
ficers which the state intended to use at 
trial, were discoverable under Md. Rule 
4-263. 
In support of the trial court's ruling, the 
state made three arguments. First, the 
state argued that Md. Rule 4-263 is not ap-
plicable to agents of another sovereign. 
The court rejected this argument noting 
that the inter-relationship between sub-
sections (a) and (b) of the rule require a dif-
ferent interpretation than that posited by 
the state in this case. Md. Rule 4-263(a) 
requires certain disclosures to be made by 
the state without the defendant's request. 
Subsection (b) deals with those matters 
discoverable on request by the accused, in-
cluding those made to a "state agent." Md. 
Rule 4-263(b )(2). However, under the 'old 
rule', subsection (a) contained the follow-
ing scope provision, conspicuously absent 
from subsection (b): "the State's Attorney's 
obligations under this section extend to ma-
terial and information in the possession or 
control of . . . any others who have par-
ticipated in the investigation ... of the case 
and who ... with reference to the particu-
lar case have reported to his office." Rule 
741(a)(3) (emphasis added). If the state's 
contention was correct, the state would be 
forced to disclose the statement because 
subsection (a) would not be limited to "state 
agents." The defense however, would not 
be able to acquire the substance of the 
statement under subsection (b) because it 
would be limited to "state agent." In addi-
tion, most motions to suppress are based 
on federal constitutional violations in ob-
taining the evidence. These violations may 
be made by either state or federal agents. 
Clearly, the state's interpretation of Md. 
Rule 4-263 creates anomalous results and 
frustrates the very purpose of the rule. 
The prosecution's second contention 
was that the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 
(1982), has applicability to the discovery 
issue here on appeal. The Jencks Act cur-
rently requires production of statements 
"in possession of the United States." The 
state claimed that the statements here are 
in possession of state officials, which would 
not constitute "in the possession of the 
United States," for purposes of the act. 
According to the court, the Jencks Act ~ 
was inapplicable to the present situation 
because the scope provisions of 4-263 
clearly prove a contrary intent. The court, 
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